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Searching for the Common Law:
The Quantitative Approach of the
Restatement of Consumer Contracts
Oren Bar-Gill,t Omri Ben-Shahartt & Florencia
Marotta- Wurglert
In 2012, the American Law Institute asked us to serve as reporters for a new
Restatement of Consumer Contracts. Recognizing that many innovations in Amer-
ican contract law in the past generation occurred in the area of consumer transac-
tions, the project seemed timely and challenging. We discovered that many of these
innovations are controversial and seemingly subject to conflicting approaches in
the case law and heated debates among commentators. We also discovered that
prior attempts to devise a unified set of rules have largely failed. We therefore de-
cided to take a new approach to our search for, and restatement of, the emerging
rules. In addition to identifying the majority rules, we used an empirical approach
that involved collecting, coding, and systematically analyzing the entire body of
court decisions on relevant questions. We identified the degree of support that dif-
ferent rules garnered in courts and the rate at which they were adopted or rejected
over time. We thus discovered which rulings and rationales serve as guiding pre-
cedent. We based the black-letter rules in the final draft of the Restatement of Con-
sumer Contracts on these findings (complementing them with qualitative support).
In this Essay, we present our empirical approach to searching for the law and legal
precedent, discuss its conceptual and normative foundations, and describe some of
the doctrinal debates it helped resolve.
INTRODUCTION
Applying a precedent is the fundamental craft of a common-
law judge. Judges do not go back to general principles to derive
novel solutions to each case at hand, along with novel justifica-
tions and renewed persuasion efforts. Instead, they turn to the
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legal decisions in prior cases with similar facts and import their
effect and reasoning.
But what is the legal precedent? What if different rules have
been previously applied to cases with similar facts? In an adver-
sarial system in which the attorneys for the disputing parties
thrive on exposing vagueness in precedent, identifying the pre-
cedent and its exact prevalence is often difficult, time intensive,
and potentially error prone.
Various methods have developed over time to reduce the
costs of searching prior law and distilling the precedent. Promi-
nent among them is the American Law Institute's (ALI) Re-
statement project, which seeks "to promote the clarification and
simplification of the law."' Restatements sometimes aspire to
steer the law in new directions, but even then it is the role of the
reporters to identify where the governing rules currently lie and
explain why they need to be reformed.
In 2012, the ALI asked us to serve as reporters for a new
Restatement of the Law, Consumer Contracts. Recognizing that
many innovations in American contract law in the past genera-
tion occurred in the area of consumer transactions, the project
seemed timely and challenging. We discovered that many of
these innovations are controversial and subject to seemingly
conflicting approaches in the case law, rendering an unclear pic-
ture of what the law actually is. We also discovered that prior
attempts to devise a unified set of rules had largely failed. We
therefore decided to take a new approach to our search for, and
restatement of, the emerging rules-a comprehensive quantita-
tive approach.
Our approach was intended to answer the question of what
rules the majority of courts and jurisdictions follow. To answer
this question, we collected the entire body of court decisions on a
given issue. We read these cases and coded their relevant facts,
characteristics, decisions, rationales, and citations. We then
used quantitative methods to analyze the database. For exam-
ple, by analyzing the statistical relationship between facts and
legal outcomes, we were able to discern the type of notice that
satisfies the doctrinal requirement of precontractual disclosure
in the formation of a.contract.
This method provided a broader, richer view of precedent in
an environment in which discerning precedent is challenging.
1 About ALL Creation (ALI), archived at http://perma.cc/9W6X-KSYZ.
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Many of the central questions in consumer contract law have not
been settled by state supreme courts, and therefore the conven-
tional ALI method of discerning the majority rule by looking to
the highest court in each state was not sufficient. We thus had
to look to federal courts and to lower state courts. But how
should they be counted and weighed?
Our basic insight was to aggregate the body of cases by
measuring the influence of each case. We calculated how many
times each ruling had been positively cited or followed, focusing
on out-of-state citations (which are used as persuasive precedent
when there is no binding intrajurisdictional precedent). We also
studied trends, looking at how the rate at which cases were
adopted or rejected changed over time. This analysis produced
more robust conclusions about which rulings and rationales
were guiding courts. Some lawyers and commentators, and even
some reporters of Restatement projects, intuit which are the
leading or influential cases. With our methodology, the relative
importance of a decision became the conclusion of our analysis.2
We based the black-letter rules in the Restatement on these
findings (complementing them in the official comments with
qualitative and normative support).3
This short Essay presents our quantitative approach. Part I
lays out jurisprudential and practical problems in searching for
the common law and legal precedent. Part II presents the quan-
titative approach and illustrates its application to two of the
most important questions in consumer contract law: the legal ef-
fect of "shrinkwrap" terms and the status of privacy "notices"
posted on websites. Finally, Part III addresses objections to the
use of the quantitative methodology.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMON LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR
PRECEDENT
This Part develops the conceptual framework for the prob-
lem of searching for common-law rules. It presents the emer-
gence of legal precedents in the common law as an information
problem, and embeds this problem within the familiar framework
2 We emphasize the importance of transparency, and we will make our databases,
search criteria, and coding decisions publicly available once the Restatement is published.
3 The empirical methodology was used to derive some, but not all, of the rules in
the draft Restatement. Some rules, such as the unconscionability rule and the deception
rule, were restated as general standards and thus were less susceptible to the empirical
methodology.
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of rules versus standards. It then discusses the effects of infor-
mation technology on the emergence of precedents.
A. From Standards to Rules
This Section makes two claims: (1) Rules and standards are
not mutually exclusive, but rather operate in tandem-at differ-
ent levels of generality. (2) Even when the general standard is
broadly accepted, the rules generated from it may be incon-
sistent and subject to intense debate, with different courts deriv-
ing different rules.
1. Coexistence of standards and rules.
Precedent-a mapping from facts to legal outcomes-is of-
ten formed through the conversion of a standard into rules. In
the common law, this conversion occurs through judicial applica-
tions of standards that provide greater precision, or specifica-
tion, to the legal command.4 Consider, for example, the legal
principle that requires mutual assent to form a contract. The
principle is clear: a contract is created when both parties signify
assent to the same set of terms.5 When contracts are not negoti-
ated and are too long for the nondrafting party to read, the prin-
ciple of signifying assent is challenging to apply.6 Does an "I
agree" click suffice? How is assent signified to terms that are
available for review only postpurchase? Or to terms that are
merely linked on websites' home pages? The general principle-
that the consumer must signify assent to the terms for them to
become binding-is clear, but what its application to a specific
scenario requires may be hotly contested.
The conversion of standards to rules is increasingly refined.
It may begin with a general principle ("signify assent"). From
the principle, common-law adjudication of consumer contracts
may derive a specific command: assent requires "reasonable
4 See Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics of Rules, in Boudewijn Bouckaert and
Gerrit De Geest, eds, 5 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics 502, 511-13 (Edward Elgar
2000). See also generally Scott Baker and Lewis Kornhauser, A Theory of Judicial Defer-
ence (unpublished manuscript, Nov 2, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/PTY3-69DF
(stating that trial courts have access to local knowledge that is not available to higher
courts, so higher courts may defer, permitting trial courts to refine the legal standard
based on the facts).
5 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 17(1) (1979).
6 See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and the
Rule of Law 82-85 (Princeton 2013); Nancy S. Kim, Wrap Contracts: Foundations and
Ramifications 192-200 (Oxford 2013).
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notice" of the terms.7 Further adjudication then translates this
intermediate standard into more specific rules. A written notice
may be reasonable, for example, if it is "conspicuous."8 Conspic-
uousness, too, has to be converted into bright-line commands:
how large the link's font has to be, where it should be placed in
the web page, what type of alert should accompany it, and so on.
While the original general standard enjoys the status of a fun-
damental principle, the precedents we seek to characterize re-
late to the more specific rules.
2. The temporal dimension.
As rules emerge from a standard, when do they replace the
standard as the basis for subsequent decisions? When the
emerging rules are new or controversial, newcomer courts may
still resort to the original standard rather than apply the bud-
ding rules. Over time, as rules become more accepted and are
followed more frequently, newcomer courts fall back to the
standard less often.
This temporal dimension depends on various factors, mostly
relating to the heterogeneity of the environment. The speed of
convergence toward well-settled rules can be quick. For exam-
ple, courts were quick to hold that clicking "I agree" to digitally
presented terms constitutes affirmative assent. 9 Other times,
convergence is slower. For example, it has taken longer for
courts to answer the question whether terms presented only
postpurchase are included in the contract. As we discuss in
Part II, clear trajectories can be identified in the process of con-
vergence, but they are slower and more difficult to observe.10
7 Kim, Wrap Contracts at 63 (cited in note 6).
8 Id at 110.
9 This quick transition was aided by legislation that established the legal effect of
electronic affirmations. The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act
(ESIGN), Pub L No 106-229, 114 Stat 464 (2000), codified at 15 USC § 7001 et seq, estab-
lished that "a signature, contract, or other record relating to [a] transaction may not be
denied legal effect, validity, or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form."
ESIGN § 101(a)(1), 114 Stat at 464, codified at 15 USC § 7001. This enactment helped
import an older rule-that a signature is an affirmation of assent to the terms above it-
to the new environment of digital terms. For a statement of the older rule, see Samuel
Williston, 2 A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 6:44 (West 4th ed 2007) (Richard A.
Lord, ed).
10 See notes 42-43 and accompanying text. In some scenarios, convergence is never
attained. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 Chi
Kent L Rev 63, 69-70 (1989) (noting that judges may have different values, which may
cause them to deviate from precedent); Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 Iowa L Rev 601,
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In general, convergence is slower the larger and more varied
the jurisdiction. In American contract law, convergence may oc-
cur quickly within each state, but more slowly across states. The
ALI's Restatement projects "assume a body of shared doctrine""1
(across the United States), which takes longer to crystalize. In-
deed, in a federal system, full convergence might not be at-
tained. Different rules may persist in different states, especially
because there is no single highest court that can resolve the
split.12
This dynamic account suggests that the timing of the search
for the "law" is important. Early on, the search might uncover
only a general standard. Later, we may find contradictory rules
or a second-order standard that has not yet matured into specific
rules. The search is most profitable if enough time is allowed for
the jurisdictions to converge to one dominant rule.13
The timing-of-search question also highlights the im-
portance of identifying temporal trends in the law. For example,
it would be relevant to note when recent decisions, while still
small in number, consistently deviate from a well-established
majority rule, suggesting perhaps a deviation from previous
practices due to exogenous factors. Such trends allow us to look
beyond a single snapshot of the law and estimate the doctrine's
evolutionary path.14 The methodology that we present in Part II
considers doctrinal trends.
640 (2001) (noting that, often, "equilibrium is unlikely to be achieved before the envi-
ronment changes').
11 Capturing the Voice of The American Law Institute: A Handbook for ALI Reporters
and Those Who Review Their Work *4 (ALI 2015), archived at http://perma.cclV8N2
-UXL3 ("ALI Style Manual").
12 Commentators often compare New York contract law and California contract
law, two systems that adhere to different rules and jurisprudential approaches across
important areas of legal doctrine. See, for example, Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains Bi-
coastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 Cardozo L Rev 1475, 1479-80 (2010); Colleen
Honigsberg, Sharon Katz, and Gil Sadka, State Contract Law and Debt Contracts, 57 J L
& Econ 1031, 1041-42 (2014) (concluding that "California represents the most pro-debtor
state and New York the most pro-lender" of those studied).
13 The evolutionary process is influenced by many forces, which we do not discuss
in this Essay. For example, selection effects play an important role-the website notices
that courts see depend on how businesses design their websites, perhaps in response to
prior rulings, and on lawyers' decisions to bring or appeal certain cases but not others.
These selection effects are relevant for a normative assessment of the common-law
evolutionary process and of the rules that it produces.
14 See ALI Style Manual at *5 (cited in note 11) (highlighting the importance of
time trends).
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B. Information Technology and the Emergence of Rules
Changes in information technology have created an abun-
dance of easily accessible case law data, allowing aggregate pat-
terns in decisions to be noticed faster and with greater precision.
Specifically, we consider two effects that information technology
produces.
The first may be called the "denominator effect." Digital
search and compilation means that the number of accessible
court decisions available for analysis is substantially higher. In
the predatabase days, only published opinions were easily avail-
able to lawyers and judges. And in the traditional method of
Restatement drafting, only a few of the published opinions in-
fluenced, and were cited by, reporters. Now, the set of available
decisions includes all published and many unpublished decisions
by all courts in multiple jurisdictions. With this large denomina-
tor of cases, a perceived rule that emerged from a commonly cited
case or treatise ("the numerator") may be revealed to be a minor-
ity position when divided by the universe of decisions. A large
denominator can thus give a more accurate snapshot of the
prevalence of a rule.
Information technology also improves identification, which
can help combat the difficulty created by large denominators.
Comprehensive databases of past decisions come with powerful
search algorithms that help identify subsets of relevant cases
and issues. Patterns can be understood by slicing the universe of
cases into clusters, providing better "resolution" of the analysis.
The blurriness that a large denominator might generate can
thus be offset by proper selection of cases, achieved by the appli-
cation of search tools. For example, information technology can
show the pace of rule convergence or provide a more accurate
measure of jurisdictional splits.16
Another effect of information technology is a shift in the risk
of abuse and of bias. While bias existed also in the predatabase
age, its manifestation in the information age is different. In the
predatabase age, a lawyer or advocate might selectively recall
only favorable cases. Better-resourced parties who could afford
more thorough searches were advantaged. In the database
15 In theory, we could limit our search to those cases that were accessible in the
predatabase world. In that sense, more information can never make things worse. But,
in practice, once the information denominator has increased, it is very difficult to artifi-
cially reduce it.
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world, on the other hand, bias can creep in through the selection
of search criteria or through filtering the "most relevant" cases
among those identified by the search engine. The advantage of a
quantitative approach is in making the search selection criteria
transparent and subject to replication scrutiny. The risk is that
most lawyers are not trained in scrutinizing search algorithms
and statistical calculations and thus may be handicapped in
challenging biased analyses.
The methodology developed in Part II seeks to exploit the
benefits of information technology while minimizing its risks. To
take advantage of the denominator effect and obtain the most
precise and complete picture of trends in the law, we first con-
sider all cases. We further offer various partitions of the data
and adopt a series of safeguards to minimize the risk of bias in
selecting search terms and in coding cases. Finally, we make the
database and our analysis openly available to allow replication
or rebuttal of our conclusions.
The accessibility of vast numbers of cases from different
courts and different jurisdictions accentuates questions of influ-
ence. The principle of stare decisis, narrowly defined, says only
that a lower court is bound by the ruling of a higher court in the
same jurisdiction. While courts have long cited persuasive, non-
binding precedent, this practice has accelerated in the database
age.1 6 Courts routinely cite, as persuasive (not binding) authority,
decisions by lower courts, unpublished decisions, and decisions
by courts from other jurisdictions, including decisions by federal
courts. Given the increasing importance of nonbinding prece-
dents, how do we determine which decision is more or less influ-
ential? To measure influence, the methodology developed in
Part II employs several objective citation counts that are com-
monly used in the academic literature on citation analysis and
legal decision-making.
II. AN EMPIRICAL APPROACH TO MEASURING THE COMMON LAW
Restatements have been entrusted with the task of clarify-
ing and harmonizing the common law since 1923.' Traditionally,
16 See F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has
Transformed the Law, 94 L Library J 563, 585-86, 590 (2002) (noting that "automation
has been a contributing factor to the extension of legal research beyond the law as tradi-
tionally defined").
17 ALI Style Manual at *3 (cited in note 11). The ALI Style Manual explains that
"Restatements are primarily addressed to courts. They aim at clear formulations of
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reporters identify a majority rule from recent decisions of the
highest courts. Sometimes a minority position is followed, when
it is more conceptually or normatively appealing, thus gently
transforming the law during the exercise of clarifying it.18
In the Restatement of Consumer Contracts, we comple-
mented the traditional approach with a comprehensive quanti-
tative review of all available case law. As explained in Part I,
our approach was intended to actuate a denominator effect-
that is, to get a sense of the true frequencies at which different
positions are followed and to empirically tease out more subtle
legal rules. Timing-wise, the most significant changes in con-
sumer contract law came about in the past generation with the
rise of digital platforms for the formation of contracts. Because
the value of waiting another decade or two to let more particular
rules develop seemed modest, the ALI concluded that the time
was ripe for a Restatement of Consumer Contracts, and our
work began.
Section A explains the basic quantitative approaches and
methods. Section B then illustrates the application of the method
to two primary legal questions: (1) Does a contract between a
business and a consumer include the standard terms that are
provided for the first time only after the purchase is concluded
(the "shrinkwrapped" terms)? (2) Is a privacy policy, which is
posted online by a business that collects users' personal data
through its website, a contract?
A. Methodology of the Empirical Approach
1. Case selection.
We isolated several issues that were at the heart of the Re-
statement project, in which the question "what is the law" was
thought to be unresolved, and in which the empirical methodol-
ogy could be effective. For each legal question amenable to this
style of analysis, we collected all available state and federal
court cases reported on Westlaw and Lexis, including un-
published decisions. Because the number of cases was not
common law and its statutory elements or variations and reflect the law as it presently
stands or might appropriately be stated by a court." Id.
18 See id at *4-5. The revised ALI Style Manual explicitly asks reporters to deter-
mine which rules are more coherent with the law as a whole and to "ascertain the rela-
tive desirability of competing rules," and invites the use of empirical analysis to achieve
these objectives. Id at *5.
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prohibitive, we did not have to engage in sampling.19 We then
coded many aspects of each case and organized cases by their
circumstances, outcomes, rationales, and subsequent influence.
More specifically, for each question, we began with natural-
language searches of words likely to bring up relevant cases,20
followed by more refined Boolean searches.21 Research assistants
read each case and removed ones not relevant. We then shepard-
ized each case from the original list to find additional cases, then
shepardized those, and so on until no new cases showed up. To
these, we added additional cases based on surveys and reviews
in leading textbooks and in professional publications. We shared
the list with ALI members and encouraged them to send us ref-
erences to cases we missed (only a handful of cases were added
in this manner).22 While the number of cases varied from ques-
tion to question, this process typically led to final samples of be-
tween twenty and two hundred cases. 23
2. Classifying outcomes and measuring case influence.
The next task was to distill the information in each case in a
manner amenable to empirical analysis. We read a sample of
cases before developing a comprehensive coding methodology.
We aimed to capture the outcomes of the cases and the ration-
ales articulated by the courts. But unlike traditional analysis,
the representation of each decision was done through frag-
ments-breaking each decision into its building blocks, which
included dozens of ingredients regarding the case characteristics
19 Lexis and Westlaw collect all published state and federal cases and, for the past
several years, some unpublished state and federal cases as well. Some unpublished fed-
eral cases are available in the Federal Appendix. For a detailed description regarding
the collection of unpublished opinions, see generally Ellen Platt, Unpublished vs. Unre-
ported: What's the Difference?, 5 Persp: Teaching Legal Rsrch & Writing 26 (1996), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/6QV2-TLGJ.
20 For example, in looking for the universe of cases addressing the circumstances
under which courts admit parol evidence in consumer contracts, we performed uncon-
strained searches of the terms "consumer," "parol," "evidence," "contract," and "standard
form," among others.
21 Also in the parol evidence example, we used searches such as "consumer AND
'standard form' AND parol" and "consumer parol evidence AND merger," among others.
22 The cases that were flagged by ALI members were few and typically were early
cases that bear a more distant (though relevant) relationship to the lineage of case law
at issue. Such cases would be hard to pick up with precise keyword searches.
23 We excluded employment cases, which sometimes dealt with identical issues, as
these are addressed in the Restatement of Employment Law, and the ALI specifically
requested that we not encroach on this neighboring project.
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and the rationale. For example, in coding the shrinkwrap24 cases,
we looked of course to the result of the case (are the terms bind-
ing?) and to the rules applied, but also to a variety of facts that
could be outcome determinative (for example, what type of no-
tice did the consumer receive?). We coded the type of business
party, the seniority of the court, which cases the court cited and
followed, and much more. 25
We analyzed case influence by comparing different commonly
used measures of citation counts.6 These include total citations,
citations by out-of-state courts, and the number of times a case
is followed by other courts. Following the literature, we focused
on citations by out-of-state and out-of-circuit courts. 27 When such
discretionary references are made,28 it is likely that the citing
court found the cited cases helpful when internal precedent was
unclear or missing. This methodology did not track the state or
court hierarchy, however, of each out-of-state citation; each cita-
tion is counted equally. Out-of-state citations are thus a clean
way to measure influence, and an ideal complement to our ana-
lysis of highest state court decisions, in which we weighted deci-
sions in a more traditional hierarchical way.
Case citation measures are transparent and unlikely to suf-
fer from the biases associated with handpicking cases, yet they
can also be noisy and suffer from both over- and underinclusive-
ness. For instance, not all cases are cited for their holdings or
24 These contracts are named for "the shrink-wrapped commercial software prod-
ucts that you buy in a box. The idea is that if you break the wrapper you are bound to
the terms that are printed below it." Radin, Boilerplate at 10 (cited in note 6).
25 We hand-coded dozens of dimensions for each case, from the basic statistics of
year, court, and class action status, to the critical details of procedural posture, sets of
facts, Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) and Restatement (Second) of Contracts provi-
sions applied, reasons articulated, and conclusions reached. For instance, we coded forty-
four different dimensions for each of seventy-four shrinkwrap cases.
26 See, for example, William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig, and Michael E. Solimine,
Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J Legal
Stud 271, 276-79 (1998) (describing one method for analyzing citation data).
27 For other applications of out-of-state and out-of-circuit citation data compila-
tions, see Gregory A. Caldeira, The Transmission of Legal Precedent: A Study of State
Supreme Courts, 79 Am Polit Sci Rev 178, 180-81 (1985); Landes, Lessig, and Solimine,
27 J Legal Stud at 276-79 (cited in note 26); David E. Klein, Making Law in the United
States Courts of Appeals 7-9, 40-46, 56-59 (Cambridge 2002); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu
Gulati, and Eric A. Posner, Judicial Evaluations and Information Forcing: Ranking
State High Courts and Their Judges, 58 Duke L J 1313, 1321-23 (2009).
28 State courts are not bound by cases decided by federal courts sitting in diversity,
so all citations to federal court cases are technically out-of-state citations even if decided
by courts within the states comprising the federal courts' jurisdiction. Landes, Lessig,
and Solimine, 27 J Legal Stud at 326 (cited in note 26).
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cited positively (although out-of-state citations are perhaps more
likely to be cited in this manner). This can lead to an overesti-
mate of influence. We addressed the problem of overinclusive-
ness by using an alternative, narrower measure of influence,
which counts only those cases that have been followed by other
courts. This captures the number of times that the principle ar-
ticulated by the court in a given case has been applied to a case
with comparable facts by another court. This measure might
prove too restrictive and lead to an underestimate of the influ-
ence of a particular case, but it advances the underlying goal-
identifying the dominant rule. Ultimately, the same cases
turned out to be influential based on a number of alternative
measures of influence, sparing us the need to trade off the pros
and cons of any particular measure. 29
B. Illustrating the Empirical Approach
1. Shrinkwrap contracts.
Few contract cases have generated as much controversy as
the Seventh Circuit's ProCD, Inc v Zeidenberg.30 The court held
that a standard-form contract shrinkwrapped inside the prod-
uct's box was enforceable even though it was impossible to ac-
cess until after the purchase was concluded.31 The decision fo-
cused on the elements of notice and the right to withdraw: as
long as the buyer had reasonable notice of the shrinkwrapped
terms and a meaningful opportunity to reject them by returning
the product, the buyer's continued use of the product constitutes
a "rolling" acceptance of the terms. 32 The court reasoned that the
shrinkwrap rule reduces transaction costs without sacrificing
29 For an explanation of how cases are annotated and citations grouped, see Case-
Base Court Annotations (LexisNexis), archived at http://perma.cc/8SYB-NJDG. Theoreti-
cally, some highly influential cases might not be cited at all because they settle an issue
for good, thus stopping all future litigation. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner,
Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J L & Econ 249, 251 (1976).
Relatedly, there is no way to address the selection effects of not including cases that set-
tle. See generally George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Lit-
igation, 13 J Legal Stud 1 (1984) (offering an explanation of which cases are selected for
litigation).
30 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
31 Id at 1450-53.
32 John E. Murray Jr, The Dubious Status of the Rolling Contract Formation Theory,
50 Duquesne L Rev 35, 37-38 (2012).
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meaningful precontractual disclosure, and thus "may be a
means of doing business valuable to buyers and sellers alike."'n
ProCD's embrace of shrinkwrap contracting generated vol-
umes of scholarship questioning both its normative grounding as
well as its descriptive influence among courts. 34 Most legal com-
mentators foresaw disastrous consequences from the expansion
of the doctrine of acceptance by silence and from the erosion of
precontractual disclosure.35 Concerns over the legitimacy of
shrinkwrap contracts have led to concerted but unsuccessful at-
tempts in the past two decades to regulate the issue through
model statutory rules.36
But has ProCD been controversial in the courts? In another
landmark case, Klocek v Gateway, Inc,37 a federal district court
rejected ProCD and held that the terms in the box, or any later-
arriving terms, are mere proposals for additional terms that
need to be affirmatively accepted.38 Prior to the empirical study
of existing case law, it was widely thought and taught that
courts around the country have split between the two approaches.
Indeed, these two leading approaches are featured in all first-
year contracts casebooks and are taught side by side.3> But does
one approach dominate?
To answer this, we assembled a comprehensive database of
shrinkwrap decisions.40 Approximately one-sixth of our cases
33 ProCD, 86 F3d at 1451.
34 See, for example, Christopher L. Pitet, Note, The Problem with "Money Now,
Terms Later": ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of "Shrinkwrap" Software
Licenses, 31 Loyola LA L Rev 325, 340-47 (1997); James J. White, Contracting under
Amended 2-207, 2004 Wis L Rev 723, 741; Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Con-
sumer E-commerce as an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 Wayne L Rev 1805, 1819-24
& n 58 (2000).
35 See, for example, Roger C. Bern, 'Terms Later" Contracting: Bad Economics, Bad
Morals, and a Bad Idea for a Uniform Law, Judge Easterbrook Notwithstanding, 12 J L
& Pol 641, 709-10 (2004); Jean Braucher, The Failed Promise of the UCITA Mass-Market
Concept and Its Lessons for Policing of Standard Form Contracts, 7 J Small & Emerging
Bus L 393, 420-21 (2003); Pitet, Note, 31 Loyola LA L Rev at 345-47 (cited in note 34);
Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the Consumer: The Shrink-Wrap
Agreement as an Adhesion Contract, 21 Cardozo L Rev 319, 350, 353-54 (1999); Murray,
50 Duquesne L Rev at 73-74 (cited in note 32).
36 See, for example, Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 208 at *90-
93 (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Oct 15, 2002), ar-
chived at http://perma.cc/A39U-8HR3.
37 104 F Supp 2d 1332 (D Kan 2000).
38 Id at 1341.
39 See, for example, Ian Ayres and Gregory Mass, Studies in Contract Law 325-31
(Foundation Press 8th ed 2012).
40 We searched using natural-language key terms including "shrinkwrap," "pay
now, terms later," "UCC 2-207," "UCC 2-204," "consumer," "standard form contract," and
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were decided before the 1996 ProCD decision and thus feature
different contracting scenarios and apply slightly different ana-
lysis. The case law addressing the enforceability of shrinkwrap
contracts has been developing mostly since the 1990s. Interest-
ingly, despite the rise of electronic contracting and the decline of
physical shrinkwraps, the pace of decisions in this area has not
slowed down. Table 1 reports some summary statistics.
TABLE 1. SHRINKWRAP CASES, 1954-2015
Court [Transaction Type
Federal District 42 Sale of Goods 41
Circuit Court of Appeals 8 Service 15
State Appellate 8 Software 6
State Supreme 7 Credit 4
State Trial 2 Real Estate 1
Date Finding
2011-2015 15 Adopts Shrinkwrap 55
2006-2010 9 Before ProCD* 5
2001-2005 20 After ProCD 50
1996-2000 13 Rejects Shrinkwrap 12
1965-1995 10 Before ProCD 5
After Pro CD 7
Class Action UCC Followed
Yes 38 § 2-204 5
No 29 § 2-207 5
Neither 57
Published
Yes 41
No 26
* Before 1996
n = 67
The main result from this analysis is the dominant effect of
ProCD and the resulting prevalence of the approach that enforces
shrinkwraps. Table 1 reports the number of instances in which
"box top." This generated an initial list of more than a hundred cases. An iterative pro-
cess of shepardizing and searching, similar to that described previously, led us to a final
body of sixty-seven cases, stretching from 1954 to 2015, with twenty-three of them com-
ing from state appellate and supreme courts and federal appellate courts.
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courts have explicitly adopted shrinkwraps as a valid contract-
formation mechanism and shows that courts have adopted
shrinkwraps in 82 percent of all cases since 1954 (fifty-five out
of sixty-seven) and in 88 percent of cases decided after ProCD
(fifty out of fifty-seven). Not all of these cases resulted in the ul-
timate enforcement of the contracts at issue, however, as en-
forcement occurred as long as the requirements of notice and
opportunity to review and reject were met, and as long as there
were no other intervening problems with the transaction, such
as unconscionability.41
ProCD's influence can also be seen in other interesting re-
spects. The case relied on UCC § 2-204. However, almost all
subsequent cases enforcing shrinkwraps have cited ProCD, not
the relevant UCC section.42 This confirms the unease that many
commentators had with ProCD's failure to apply UCC § 2-207.43
A closer look at the evolution of the decisions over time re-
veals a trend toward overwhelming acceptance of shrinkwraps
and the ProCD decision. In Figure 1, we split cases into those
that endorse shrinkwrap contracts and those that do not. Before
1996 (the left vertical line), the year when ProCD was decided,
shrinkwraps were embraced in half the cases (five out of ten).
But after ProCD, there was an immediate shift in favor of en-
forcement. As mentioned before, since 1996 courts have en-
dorsed shrinkwrap contracts in 88 percent of cases (fifty out of
fifty-seven). The landmark case denying enforcement, Klocek,
was decided in 2000 (the right vertical line), but this decision
has not generated nearly as much of a following. In fact, the last
41 Table 1 reports whether the court explicitly adopted the shrinkwrap contract-
enforcement mechanism, regardless of the ultimate outcome. In a minority of cases, the
court adopted shrinkwraps but refused to enforce the contract in the given case because
of intervening circumstances. See, for example, Brower v Gateway 2000, Inc, 246 AD2d
246, 250, 254 (NY App 1998) (declining to enforce the contract because the right to reject
was too onerous, rendering the contract unconscionable); Schnabel v Trilegiant Corp, 697
F3d 110, 126-31 (2d Cir 2012) (declining to enforce the contract because e-mailed notice
was inadequate).
42 Only four of the cases that have enforced shrinkwraps cited the UCC as a source
of authority. See, for example, DeFontes v Dell, Inc, 984 A2d 1061, 1067-71 (RI 2009)
(citing UCC § 2-204 as a source of authority, in addition to ProCD). The remainder cited
ProCD.
43 See, for example, Pitet, Note, 31 Loyola LA L Rev at 340-42 (cited in note 34)
(criticizing ProCD as "at odds with both the plain language of the UCC and its intent to
liberalize the common law rules of contract formation"). See also Bern, 12 J L & Pol at
642-43 (cited in note 35) (recounting commentators' descriptions of the ProCD line of
cases as "dangerously misinterpret[ing] legislation and precedent," "dead wrong," and a
"detour from traditional U.C.C. analysis").
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time a shrinkwrap contract was rejected because of the rolling-
formation procedure was in 2005. In the past eleven years,
courts have embraced shrinkwrap contracting in all twenty-four
cases in which they have had to address the issue.
FIGURE 1. ACCEPTANCE OF SHRINKWRAP ("PAY Now, TERMS
LATER" OR "PNTL") CONTRACTS: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF CASES
1955 1975
year
60
40
20
A
1995
- - PNTL Rejected - PNTL Adopted
An analysis of citations reinforces the impression of ProCD's
influence. Table 2 reports the most influential cases in this area
according to citations by out-of-state and out-of-circuit courts
and lists cases that have been cited at an average rate of at least
two out-of-state citations per year. (Focusing on the citation
rate, rather than the total number of citations, controls for the
fact that some cases have simply been around longer.) Cases ac-
cepting the shrinkwrap formation procedure (listed as "Shrink-
wrap Adopted") are much more likely to get cited out of state in
a given year. Indeed, citations to ProCD alone account for a sub-
stantial fraction of citations. These findings also hold under al-
ternative citation measures, including measures taking into ac-
count within-jurisdiction citations (for which the data are
unreported). The only reasonably influential case that did not
Z4
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enforce shrinkwrap terms, Klocek, is cited an average of just
twice per year.
TABLE 2. MOST INFLUENTIAL SHRINKWRAP CASES: OUT-OF-
STATE CITATIONS BY SHRINKWRAP ADOPTION; CASES WITH AT
LEAST Two CITATIONS PER YEAR*
Out-of-State Out-of-State
Citations Citations per
Decided Total Year
Shrinkwrap Adopted
ProCD, Incv 1996 169 9
Zeidenberg44
Hill v Gateway 1997 92 5
2000, Inc45
Brower v Gateway 1998 52 3
2000, Inc46
Marsh v First USA 2000 48 3
Bank, NA47
Bowers v Baystate 34 3
Technologies, Inc48
Bischoff v
DirecTV, Inc49
Shrinkwrap Not Adopted
Klocek v
Gateway, Incso
* Through August 2014
As noted previously, a limitation of the citation methodology
is that it fails to account for court hierarchy. What would we
learn if we restricted the analysis to published state high court
and federal appellate court cases, as in the traditional approach?
44 86 F3d 1447 (7th Cir 1996).
45 105 F3d 1147 (7th Cir 1997).
4 246 AD2d 246 (NY App 1998).
47 103 F Supp 2d 909 (ND Tex 2000).
48 320 F3d 1317 (Fed Cir 2003).
49 180 F Supp 2d 1097 (CD Cal 2002).
50 104 F Supp 2d 1332 (D Kan 2000).
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Broadly speaking, a similar picture appears, but not as sharply.
Fifteen state high courts and federal appellate courts have ruled
on the enforceability of shrinkwrap contracts. In eleven of those
decisions, or over two-thirds of those with shrinkwrap decisions,
the most recent decision endorses shrinkwraps.51 No cases have
been decided in the remaining four jurisdictions since 2005.52
And with one exception, no state high court case has received
even two out-of-state citations per year. The influence of state
supreme court cases beyond their own jurisdiction has been
modest. Essentially all the activity is happening in federal
courts, even as they decide state law questions. In short, courts
have generally embraced shrinkwrap contracts and the logic of
ProCD.
In light of this finding-that shrinkwrap contracts are en-
forced by a great majority of courts-we drafted the following
black-letter rule in § 2(b) of the Restatement:
When the standard contract terms are available for review
only after the consumer signifies assent to the transaction,
the standard contract terms are adopted as part of the con-
sumer contract if
(1) the consumer receives reasonable notice regarding
the presence of standard contract terms before signify-
ing assent to the transaction, and
(2) the consumer has a reasonable opportunity to avoid
or terminate the transaction after the standard contract
51 For cases in which courts adopted shrinkwraps, see Schnabel, 697 F3d at 126-31
(adopting shrinkwraps but declining to enforce the contract because e-mailed notice was
inadequate); DeFontes, 984 A2d at 1067-68 (applying Texas state law in a Rhode Island
state court); Rico v Cappaert Manufactured Housing, Inc, 903 S2d 1284, 1289-90 (La
App 2005); 1-A Equipment Co v Icode, Inc, 2003 WL 549913, *2 (Mass App) (applying
Virginia state law); M.A. Mortenson Co v Timberline Software Corp, 998 P2d 305, 313
(Wash 2006) (en banc); James v McDonald's Corp, 417 F3d 672, 677-78 (7th Cir 2005)
(applying Kentucky state law); Goode v Franklin Welding & Equipment Co, 50 Va Cir
441, 446-48 (1999) (available on Westlaw at 1999 WL 33722385); Hill, 105 F3d at 1148-
49; Brower, 246 AD2d at 250, 254; Tiger Motor Co v McMurtry, 224 S2d 638, 643, 647
(Ala 1969); Marion Power Shovel Co v Huntsman, 437 SW2d 784, 787 (Ark 1969).
52 For cases in which courts refused to adopt late-arriving terms, see Rogers v Dell
Computer Corp, 138 P3d 826, 832-34 (Okla 2005); A.B.C. Home & Real Estate Inspec-
tion, Inc v Plummer, 500 NE2d 1257, 1261-62 (Ind App 1986); Whitaker v Farmhand,
Inc, 567 P2d 916, 921 (Mont 1977); Deering, Milliken & Co v Drexler, 216 F2d 116, 119
(5th Cir 1954).
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terms are made available for review, and does not exer-
cise that power.5 3
2. Are privacy policies contracts?
The second illustration of the empirical approach comes
from another fundamental problem that is clouded with some
doctrinal uncertainty: Are online privacy notices that businesses
post on their websites treated by courts as contracts? These no-
tices, often appearing as hyperlinks at the bottom of home pages,
declare what information the business collects, how the infor-
mation is used or shared, and what data-security measures the
business applies.
With the rapid rise of information collection by businesses,
the number of consumer actions for violation of data privacy has
been growing sharply.54 Many of these actions rise or fall de-
pending on whether the privacy notices are treated as contracts.
Remarkably, however, this classification question has yet to re-
ceive a clear answer. Commentary in the privacy-law area has
left some confusion regarding the enforceability of privacy notices
as contracts.
This confusion is perhaps the result of the eclectic founda-
tions of data-privacy law. For example, the recent draft of the
Principles of the Law of Data Privacy counts numerous sources
for the regulation of data privacy, including constitutional law,
privacy statutes, Federal Trade Commission law, and tort law.66
It recognizes that some of these background rules are merely
"gap-fillers" by saying that "consent" can expand the permission
of businesses to collect, use, and share users' data.56 But it views
consent as arising from the informed consent doctrine of tort
law, rather than as the exercise of contractual capacity in the
marketplace.6" It further articulates sui generis consent and
"heightened notice" rules, not founded in general contract law
doctrine, which apply only to agreements over data privacy.58
53 Restatement of Consumer Contracts § 2(b) (ALI Council Draft No 2, 2016) (on file
with authors).
54 Eric C. Bosset, et al, Private Actions Challenging Online Data Collection Practices
Are Increasing: Assessing the Legal Landscape, 23 Intel Prop & Tech L J 3, 6-7 (Feb
2011) (discussing the "wave of recent lawsuits" brought about by "new concerns about
consumer privacy").
55 See Principles of the Law: Data Privacy § 1 at 7-10 (ALI Council Draft No 1, 2016).
56 Id at 44-45.
57 See id § 4 at 31-33.
58 Id § 4 at 30-32.
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Our analysis sought to clarify whether courts indeed apply such
sui generis rules, or whether standard, garden-variety contrac-
tual consentis all that is required to enforce privacy policies.
More generally, we asked whether courts enforce privacy prac-
tices as contracts.
The answer to this question-whether privacy notices are
contracts-has evolved over time.59 In a very early case, Dyer v
Northwest Airlines Corp,60 a federal district court held that
Northwest Airlines' posted privacy policy was not a contract. 61
The court stated that "broad statements of company policy do
not generally give rise to contract claims."62 Despite the fact that
other courts have reached the opposite conclusion,63 the view in
Dyer has been emphasized in prominent academic treatments.64
To establish whether privacy notices are classified as con-
tracts, we began by dividing the universe of cases into two cate-
gories: (i) "sword" cases, in which consumer-plaintiffs sought to
enforce promises and representations made in privacy policies
(as in the Dyer case above); and (ii) "shield" cases, in which
business-defendants sought to enforce their own policies, arguing
that they constitute contracts and that consumers' assent to
them is a defense against the alleged privacy violations. Again,
59 The question whether privacy notices should be classified as contracts has been
conflated with the question whether plaintiffs should win lawsuits alleging violation of
privacy. In particular, there are other reasons why plaintiffs lose, even if the privacy no-
tices are contracts. First, many cases have been dismissed for plaintiffs' failure to estab-
lish damages, even when courts explicitly recognized privacy policies as contracts. See,
for example, In re American Airlines, Inc, Privacy Litigation, 370 F Supp 2d 552, 567
(ND Tex 2005). Second, many businesses sued for breaches of their privacy policies, such
as Google or Facebook, use novel business models in which their services are advertise-
ment based or offered for free in exchange for access to consumer personal information.
This has led some courts to question whether consideration exists. See, for example, Austin-
Spearman v AARP and AARP Services Inc, 119 F Supp 3d 1, 11-12 (DDC 2015). Finally,
some privacy policies have not been conspicuously presented, leading courts to deny their
enforcement on the basis of generic assent rules (for example, lack of sufficient notice).
See, for example, Be In, Inc v Google Inc, 2013 WL 5568706, *9 (ND Cal). Issues such as
these underscore the importance of identifying the relevant parameters in coding cases
to correctly elicit the relevant legal principle.
60 334 F Supp 2d 1196 (D ND 2004).
61 Id at 1199-1200.
62 Id at 1200.
63 See, for example, In re JetBlue Airways Corp Privacy Litigation, 379 F Supp 2d 299,
325-26 (EDNY 2005) (holding that privacy policies give rise to contractual obligations).
64 See, for example, Daniel J. Solove and Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New
Common Law of Privacy, 114 Colum L Rev 583, 595-97 (2014) (surveying a small num-
ber of cases and reporting that courts do not enforce privacy policies as contracts); Daniel
J. Solove and Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy Law Fundamentals 101 (IAPP 2011) (reporting
that courts do not recognize privacy policies as contracts).
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we used the search methodology to assemble a comprehensive
database of all decided cases.65 Table 3 summarizes some of the
findings and case characteristics.
TABLE 3. PRIVACY POLICIES ("PP") SAMPLE, 2004-2015
Court | Claim Type
Federal District 48 Sword 24
State Appellate 2 Shield 22
State Trial 1 Consent for 5
Statutory
Liability
Date Transaction Type
2011-2015 33 Service 35
2006-2010 12 Sale of Goods 6
2004-2005 6 Privacy 5
Software 2
Class Action Credit 1
Yes 33 Leasing 1
No 18 Real Estate 1
Published Finding
Yes 17 PP Recognized 35
No 34 PP Not Recog- 5
nized (Because
Not Contracts)
PP Not Recog- 11
nized (Other)*
* Insufficient Notice, Cannot Ascertain Damages, Lack of Mutuality and Con-
sideration, etc.
n = 51
65 We searched using natural language and different Boolean combinations of "pri-
vacy policy," "contract," "enforce," "breach," "privacy notice," "consent," "consumer,"
"state recording statute," etc. This generated an initial list of several hundred cases. An
iterative process of shepardizing and searching, similar to that described previously, led
us to a final body of fifty-one cases, beginning with Dyer in 2004 and ending with Austin-
Spearman in 2015.
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By enlarging the scope of the analysis to include all cases,
some clear patterns arise. The most important pattern is the an-
swer to our basic question: privacy policies are typically recog-
nized as contracts. The original Dyer case, which reached the
opposite result and which continues to inform many claims by
privacy scholars, has in fact been rejected by a large majority of
courts. Among all cases deciding this issue, courts are seven
times more likely to recognize privacy policies as contracts than
they are not to recognize them as contracts (thirty-five cases
versus five cases). An approach that focuses on the decisions of
higher courts leads to the same conclusion: the two state appel-
late courts to address this issue have suggested that privacy pol-
icies could be contracts.
Plaintiffs' difficulty in ultimately succeeding in these claims
is demonstrated by the eleven cases in which courts concluded
that the plaintiffs failed to establish an element of their contract
claims, such as an inability to ascertain damages.66 In these cases,
the question whether privacy policies are contracts was side-
stepped, but the willingness of courts to address issues internal
to contract enforcement-such as the measure of damages for
breach-provides further evidence for the rejection of the origi-
nal Dyer case.
The evolution of the case law over time shows a drift away
from the Dyer position. Figure 2 illustrates the cumulative
number of cases in which courts recognized privacy notices as
contracts, those in which courts concluded that they are not con-
tracts, and those in which the privacy notice was not enforced
because plaintiffs failed to establish one or more elements of a
contract claim. In 2004 and 2005, courts were evenly split in
their treatment of privacy policies as contracts. After 2005, how-
ever, courts have predominantly recognized privacy policies as
contracts, evidencing a trend in favor of enforcement.
66 See note 59.
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FIGURE 2. RECOGNITION OF PRIVACY POLICIES ("PP') AS
CONTRACTS
40
30
20
10
2005 2010 2019
- PP Recognized
- - PP Not Recognized (Not Contracts)
PP Not Recognized (Other)
This conclusion is further supported by an analysis of cita-
tions. Cases recognizing privacy notices as contracts are not only
more numerous but also more influential. Cases recognizing pri-
vacy policies as contracts are more likely to get cited out of state.
The same is true based on a narrower measure of influence, the
number of times a case is followed. The dominant case is In re
JetBlue Airways Corp Privacy Litigation,67 with a total of thirty-
nine out-of-state citations and an average of four citations per
year. Dyer heads the list of cases refusing recognition, but its
sixteen out-of-state citations amount to an average of just over
one citation per year.
The picture that comes out of this empirical inquiry is,
again, clear. Privacy notices are regarded by a great majority of
courts as the subject matter of contracts, to be evaluated by the
same assent rules that are applied to other contract terms.
Courts do not require a sui generis consent or notice element.
67 379 F Supp 2d 299 (EDNY 2005).
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Accordingly, we drafted the following comment 8 to § 1 of the
Restatement:
Privacy notices included. The definition of "Consumer Con-
tract" includes agreements about privacy-standard terms
relating to information collected, used, shared, protected, or
otherwise handled by the business, including but not lim-
ited to consumers' personal information. All rules of con-
tract law, including the specific rules in this Restatement,
as well as remedial rules not included in this Restatement,
apply to agreements about privacy. For the purpose of this
definition, "personal information" means any data that re-
fers to an identified person or that can be used to identify a
person.68
III. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
A. Legal Reasoning
One could conceive of the quantitative approach to measur-
ing the common law as delegating the resolution of conflicting
arguments and judicial splits to a formula or an algorithm. The
approach would thus diminish the role of legal reasoning in rec-
onciling such debates. Rather than analyzing the comparative
merits of different positions and exercising tailored discretion,
the approach relies on a preconfigured measurement method.
Accordingly, the first line of opposition to this approach bemoans
the replacement of traditional legal reasoning by robotic analyt-
ics. Restatements require thinking, not counting.
This objection raises an important and even profound issue.
Law is not mathematics: it is a rich body of knowledge, fleshed
out through pragmatic deliberation about values.69 Legal reason-
ing requires intuition and prudence.70 Practical wisdom acquired
by experience matters, as it sharpens the insight and recognizes
tone and nuance.71 Thus, legal thinking appears to be inconsistent
68 Restatement of Consumer Contracts § 1, comment 8 (ALI Council Draft No 2,
2016) (on file with authors).
69 See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1139bl9-36 (Chicago 2011) (Robert C. Bartlett
and Susan D. Collins, trans).
70 See Bent Flyvbjerg, Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and
How It Can Succeed Again 56-57, 59 (Cambridge 2001) (Steven Sampson, trans).
71 See Helen Xanthaki, Drafting Legislation: Art and Technology of Rules for Regu-
lation 13-14 (Hart 2014).
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with a methodological shift toward a value-neutral, nonprag-
matic method of aggregation.
This critique is conceptually misguided. The quantitative
approach does not replace thinking with counting, nor does it
eliminate the role of legal reasoning in the practice and devel-
opment of the law. Instead, it provides both a less manipulable
starting point for this traditional enterprise and a more accurate
summary of the output.
Consider the value of the quantitative approach as a start-
ing point for legal reasoning. Legal reasoning is applied, not in
determining what the baseline legal rule is, but rather in apply-
ing it to a particular dispute or new circumstances. When the
baseline rule is clear and undisputed-for example, when it is a
bright-line command articulated in a statute-legal reasoning is
the only methodological exercise necessary in applying it to a
new scenario. But when the baseline rule is ambiguous or dis-
puted, the quantitative approach helps identify it. In a common-
law system that relies on broader principles and vague standards,
the starting point for legal reasoning has to be the up-to-date
aggregation of the prior applications of the standard.72 It is this
survey of prior art that traditional methods perform only par-
tially through nonrandom sampling, and in which the quantita-
tive approach offers a more representative snapshot.
The quantitative approach supports the exercise of legal
discretion in another manner-by providing a more accurate
summary of its output. It counts cases in which traditional
forms of discretion were applied. It presents a comprehensive
aggregation of the collective effort by various courts to apply le-
gal reasoning. The empirical method eliminates ad hoc discre-
tion in only one respect-how to count. Moreover, a good quanti-
tative algorithm would place greater weight on decisions in
which reasoning was applied, such as decisions by courts that
felt unconstrained by prior precedent and thus free to exercise
independent discretion, and less weight on decisions in which
reasoning was either not explicitly applied or not explained.
It is true that the quantitative method has to be implemented
with skills that are not traditionally acquired by lawyers. Cases
have to be coded and patterns have to be detected using some
simple quantitative tools. But the method is just as transparent,
and perhaps more so, than traditional methods of identifying
72 See, for example, Kornhauser, 65 Chi Kent L Rev at 90-92 (cited in note 10).
2017]1 31
The University of Chicago Law Review
precedent, which are prone to relying on a subset of prior deci-
sions selected subjectively and often appear more inclusive than
they really are. The quantitative method applies a selection rule
that is transparent, and the results are replicable in a way that
allows reporters to explain their methodology and readers to
verify it.
B. Stifling Law Reform
The second major objection to the quantitative approach is
normative. What if the outcome of the analysis yields rules that
are undesirable? This objection might be particularly sharp
when the approach is applied in the context of a reevaluation of
the law. At such pivotal times, the opportunity to chart a new
direction and reform the law could be lost.
The bulk of the specific objections that we have received
over the course of drafting the Restatement of Consumer Con-
tracts have been along these normative lines, and have been de-
livered by scholars who oppose the substance of the rules that
the analysis yielded. For example, as detailed in Part II, the
methodology identified the dominant prevalence of permissive
assent rules, which we thereby incorporated into § 2 of the Re-
statement. Critics who view the § 2 rules as normatively unde-
sirable rejected the empirical methodology that produced these
rules. These critics find the reasoning in the leading cases (the
shrinkwrap cases that the quantitative approach identified as
most influential3) to be substantively unpersuasive. They argue
that the "easy assent rules" produce lengthy contracts that harm
consumers, and they prefer strict assent rules that would render
most standard contract terms unenforceable. 7
This objection to the conclusion of the quantitative approach
is important and legitimate. But it is not a critique of our meth-
odology. The quantitative approach was used to identify the ma-
jority rule, and we were criticized by those who believe that the
majority rule is undesirable.76 The same critics would object to
this majority rule regardless of the methodology used to identify
73 See Table 2. The cases identified as influential in Table 2 were ProCD and Hill v
Gateway 2000, Inc, 105 F3d 1147 (7th Cir 1997).
74 For examples of this negative view of shrinkwrap cases, see note 35.
75 The ALI describes Restatements as generally favoring majority holdings over
normative evaluations: "[W]hile views of which competing rules lead to more desirable
outcomes should play a role in both inquiries, the choices generally are constrained by
the need to find support in sources of law." ALI Style Manual at *6 (cited in note 11).
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it. Their argument is that we should reject the majority rule and
promote the "better-reasoned" minority rule. There are good rea-
sons for a Restatement project not to stray too far from the ma-
jority rule.76 Still, in appropriate cases, an argument can be
made for preferring the minority position77 In any event, these
important debates are orthogonal to the methodological ap-
proach used to identify the majority rule.
Moreover, the claim that the quantitative approach shuts
down the cogwheels of law reform is fundamentally misguided.
Innovations in common law happen primarily in courts. The
quantitative approach serves only to detect and highlight such
innovations, which might otherwise go unnoticed by some mem-
bers of the legal community. Indeed, the raisons d'6tre for the
Restatement of Consumer Contracts were the perception that
the common-law rules governing consumer transactions have
branched out and the ambition of the ALI to document the
emerging trends and broaden their recognition. A loyal reflec-
tion of these novel patterns through an empirical approach
would only bolster the common law's innovation machinery.
Ironically, a principal complaint voiced by critics who object to
the substantive aspects of the shrinkwrap assent rule-which
our methodology identified as the prevailing precedent-is that
the shrinkwrap rule is itself a reform of the law.78 They correctly
76 Pragmatically, the influence of a Restatement is likely to diminish the further it
strays from accepted principles and precedents. In fact, prominent judges have voiced
increasing skepticism about attempts by Restatement reporters to draft provisions not
grounded in prior precedent. See, for example, Kansas v Nebraska, 135 S Ct 1042, 1064
(2015) (Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part).
77 The ALI can point to some earlier Restatements that have allegedly triggered
significant reform in American law. Foremost among the reform-oriented Restatement
provisions are § 90 of the Restatement (First) of Contracts (introducing promissory es-
toppel) and § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (introducing strict liability for
defective products as a tort concept). Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract 68 (Ohio
State 2d ed 1995) (Ronald K.L. Collins, ed) (discussing the unconventional nature of § 90
when introduced); Marshall S. Shapo, In Search of the Law of Products Liability: The
ALI Restatement Project, 48 Vand L Rev 631, 636-37 (1995) (claiming § 402A "proved
itself in the final marketplace for juridical ideas: the courts"). It should be pointed out
that, at least in the case of § 90, there is skepticism about its influence. See, for example,
Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppel: An Empir-
ical and Theoretical Study, 98 Colum L Rev 580, 588-95 (1998) (demonstrating courts'
reluctance to allow recovery under § 90).
78 See, for example, Stewart Macaulay, Freedom from Contract: Solutions in Search
of a Problem?, 2004 Wis L Rev 777, 805-06 (claiming that it is difficult for "contract pur-
ist[s]" to accept shrinkwrap agreements as contracts); Pitet, Note, 31 Loyola LA L Rev at
340-41 (cited in note 34) (remarking that ProCD's enforcement of shrinkwrap was "wholly
inconsistent" with the UCC).
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note that, in adopting the shrinkwrap rule, courts have expanded
the domain of acceptance by silence beyond the traditional scope
of this rule in general contract law. Critics would like to see such
reform rolled back, restoring the old conception of contract
formation79
CONCLUSION
The empirical study of law has blossomed in recent years,
adding important realism to legal scholarship. But the vast ma-
jority of this undertaking focuses on the empirical evaluation of
the effects of laws. This Essay contributes, instead, to a budding,
but as of yet much smaller, project-the empirical evaluation of
what the law is.
In the Restatement project, our quantitative method was
relatively labor-intensive. It relied on an actual reading of each
case in our database and careful discretional coding of many as-
pects of each case. This was a manageable effort because the
number of cases was not prohibitive. We can imagine that a sim-
ilar method could be applied to resolve a host of other issues, in
which the answer to "what is the law" is clouded with some un-
certainty. For example, it could resolve the long-standing debate
over whether the reasonable-expectations doctrine in contract
law can override unambiguous fine print terms. Our quantita-
tive method could also resolve questions regarding the applica-
tion of comparative negligence in tort law, of market power tests
in antitrust law, of capacity to deceive (or likelihood of confu-
sion) in the law of false advertising and unfair competition, and
in many more areas.
When the relevant body of case law is too large to be com-
prehensively read and coded, other statistical methods would
have to complement the empirical approach. Sampling may be
one solution. Machine reading and text search may be another.
Finally, it is worth reiterating that the application of a
quantitative approach to the search of law does not make the
traditional qualitative approach obsolete. Cases cannot be read
and coded without a fundamental understanding of the underly-
ing issues. Their rationales need to be isolated and compared,
and discretion has to be exercised in identifying contrasts or
similarities across decisions. Moreover, the empirical model
79 "The activist judges of the Seventh Circuit have struck again," lamented one
leading critic of ProCD. Macaulay, 2004 Wis L Rev at 806 (cited in note 78).
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would be pointless unless the results could be interpreted and
the justifications drawn out. This has long been the method of
the common law-reading a few older cases and learning from
them. The main novelty of the quantitative approach is in rely-
ing not on a few past cases but on many (or all). As in any em-
pirical methodology, the larger n provides greater accuracy and
reliability.

